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Determinants of Performance Measure
Choices in Worker Incentive Plans
Christopher D. Ittner, University of Pennsylvania
David F. Larcker, University of Pennsylvania
This study examines the determinants of performance measure
choices in worker incentive plans. The results indicate that inform-
ativeness issues such as those addressed in economic theories have a
significant effect on measurement choices. However, other reasons
for adopting the plans, such as upgrading the workforce and linking
bonuses to the firm’s ability to pay, also influence measurement
choices, as do union representation and management participation in
plan design. Moreover, the factors influencing the use of specific
measures vary, suggesting that the aggregate performance measure
classifications commonly used in compensation research provide
somewhat misleading inferences regarding performancemeasurement
choices.
I. Introduction
This study examines some of the factors influencing the choice of per-
formance measures in worker (nonmanagement) incentive plans. A large
body of research has investigated the design of compensation contracts
and reward systems, highlighting the importance of performance measure
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choice in contract design. Much of this research is based on economic
theories showing that the choice of performance measures in incentive
contracts should be based on the informativeness (or incremental infor-
mation content) principle. Agency models by Holmstrom (1979), Banker
and Datar (1989), and Feltham and Xie (1994), for example, demonstrate
that performance measurement systems should include any (costless) per-
formance measure that provides incremental information on the actions
the principal wishes to motivate in order to promote congruence between
the principal’s objective and that of the agent.
Despite this theoretical research, relatively little empirical evidence ex-
ists on the factors associated with the choice of performance measures in
incentive plans. Most studies have focused on CEO bonus contracts (e.g.,
Lambert and Larcker 1987; Ely 1991; Sloan 1993; Bushman, Indjejikian,
and Smith 1996; Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan 1997) or business unit per-
formance evaluation (e.g., Govindarajan and Gupta 1985; Simons 1987;
Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith 1995; Keating 1997) and have ignored
worker-level incentive plans. Prior studies have generally examined ag-
gregate performance measure classifications (e.g., financial vs. nonfinan-
cial, business unit vs. corporate, etc.) rather than specific performance
measures (e.g., accounting returns, cost control, quality, productivity, vol-
ume, etc.). Moreover, few studies have examined factors other than the
measures’ informativeness. Existing research typically assumes that in-
centive plans are designed purely to ensure that agents are motivated to
take actions desired by the principal, even though other factors such as
employee attraction and retention, the ability to shift financial risks to
workers, and the relative power of different stakeholder groups can also
affect these choices (e.g., Merchant 1989; Heneman, Ledford, and
Gresham 1999; Waggoner, Neeley, and Kennerley 1999).
This study provides exploratory insights into these issues by examining
a broad set of potential performance measure determinants in worker
incentive plans. We conduct our analysis using survey data collected by
the Consortium for Alternative Reward Strategies Research (McAdams
and Hawk 1994). Our sample consists of 607 incentive plans covering
nonmanagement employees and having a clear, preannounced perform-
ance-payout link. The survey provides data on the performance measures
used to compute plan payouts, the reasons for adopting the plan, and the
implementation process used by the organization.
Our results indicate that informativeness issues such as those addressed
in economic theories are key factors in the selection of performance mea-
sures for worker incentive plans. However, we also find that other reasons
for adopting the plan (i.e., promoting organizational change, improving
the link between pay and firm performance, and upgrading the workforce)
also play a role in performance measure choices, as do union represen-
tation and management participation in plan design. Moreover, the factors
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influencing the use of specific measures vary, suggesting that the aggregate
performance measure classifications commonly used in compensation re-
search, such as the comparison of financial versus nonfinancial metrics,
provide somewhat misleading inferences regarding performance mea-
surement choices.
The remainder of the article is organized into four sections. In Section
II, we provide an overview of theoretical discussions on the choice of
performance measures. In Section III, we discuss the sample and variables
used in the study, and in Section IV we analyze the determinants of
incentive plan performance measures. Conclusions and limitations to our
research are presented in Section V.
II. Theoretical Overview
A. Classifying Performance Measures
A variety of taxonomies have been proposed to classify the performance
measures used in incentive plans. A common distinction is between fi-
nancial (or accounting) measures and nonfinancial (or operational) mea-
sures. Although financial measures such as costs, profits, or accounting
returns have traditionally played a major role in compensation contracts,
many believe that nonfinancial measures such defect rates, cycle time, and
productivity, which tend to be more disaggregate and task-specific than
financial measures, are better at signaling the actions workers can take to
improve overall performance and at isolating the contribution of particular
workers or activities (e.g., Wruck and Jensen 1994; Brancato 1995). Fi-
nancial measures have also been criticized for being too historical and
“backward-looking,” for rewarding short-term or incorrect behavior, and
for giving inadequate consideration to the development of “intangible”
assets such as intellectual capital and employee capabilities. As a result,
many companies are supplementing or replacing their traditional financial
measures with nonfinancial performance indicators (Ittner and Larcker
1998).
Other taxonomies suggest that the distinction between financial and
nonfinancial measures is an incomplete representation of performance
measure characteristics. Cross and Lynch (1988/1989), for example, pro-
pose a performance measurement “pyramid” that classifiesmeasures based
on their level in the organizational hierarchy. According to this classifi-
cation, the key distinction between different types of performance mea-
sures is not whether they are financial or nonfinancial, but the breadth
of activities captured by the measures and their level of specificity. At the
top of the pyramid are broad corporate metrics that include financial
measures such as profits and cash flow, as well as nonfinancial measures
such as market penetration. At the next lower level, business operating
system measures emphasize more tangible operating objectives such as
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customer satisfaction, flexibility, productivity, and cost. Operational mea-
sures form the base of the pyramid, emphasizing the specific financial
(e.g., unit cost) or nonfinancial (e.g., quality, delivery, or process time)
goals needed to achieve higher-level results.
Heneman et al. (1999) stress the measures’ controllability and the trade-
offs between their motivational value and the firm’s ability to pay bonuses.
They argue that the performance measures in worker incentive plans can
range from very concrete “behavioral” measures (accidents, absenteeism,
safety inspection ratings, etc.) to measures of unit performance (produc-
tivity, cost, quality, on-time delivery, cycle time, etc.) to broad measures
of financial performance (return on investment, profit, etc.). Heneman et
al. (1999) contend that behavioral measures have the greatest motivational
value at lower organizational levels because they have strong “line of
sight,” which refers to the ability of workers to understand how their
actions affect bonus awards.1 Financial performance metrics are more
closely tied to the organization’s ability to pay. If the organization is
doing well, it can afford to pay bonuses. If it is not doing well, no bonuses
are paid. However, workers often have modest control over broad finan-
cial results, reducing their motivational value. Unit performance metrics,
which can be financial or nonfinancial, are in the middle on the criteria
of motivation versus ability to pay. Employees can influence them more
easily than broad financial measures, but not as easily as behavioral mea-
sures. Moreover, while improvements in unit performance metrics ulti-
mately are expected to improve financial performance, the relation is far
from perfect and may only occur with considerable lag.
Although the preceding taxonomies represent just a few that can be
used to classify performance measures, they highlight a number of key
characteristics that distinguish the performance measures in worker in-
centive plans. In the following sections, we discuss some of the theoretical
factors that are expected to influence these measurement choices.
B. Informativeness
In a rational contracting setting, the performance measures in incentive
plans should be selected to motivate workers to act in the manner desired
by the owners of the firm. Economics-based agency models indicate that
the choice of performance measures in this setting should be a function
of the informativeness (or incremental information content) of each mea-
sure regarding the worker’s action choices (e.g., Holmstrom 1979). The
1 The desirability of strong “line of sight” is emphasized in expectancy theories,
which argue that employees will be motivated to perform at higher levels when
they understand how their efforts lead to outcomes, and how these outcomes
lead to rewards. See Van Eerde and Thierry (1996) for a review of the expectancy
literature.
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relative weight placed on an individual measure, in turn, should be a
function of the measure’s sensitivity (or the change in its mean value in
response to a change in the agent’s action) and precision (or the inverse
of the variance in the measure) (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Banker and
Datar 1989).
While these models provide insight into the optimal design of incentive
plans, they say little about the specific measures that should be used for
compensation purposes. More recent agency models extend these studies
to investigate the role of nonfinancial measures in compensation contracts
(Feltham and Xie 1994; Hauser, Siemester, and Wernerfelt 1994; Hemmer
1996). These models suggest that financial measures alone are unlikely to
be the most efficient means to motivate employees, and they demonstrate
how incentives based on nonfinancial measures can improve contracting
by incorporating information on agents’ actions that is not fully captured
in contemporaneous financial results. One implication of these studies is
that nonfinancial measures should be relatively more informative when
the lag between the agent’s actions and the resulting financial conse-
quences is longer.
Agency models have also examined the credibility of the “controlla-
bility” principle as a criterion for selecting performance measures. This
principle holds that employees should only be held accountable for actions
or results they control. In contrast, Antle and Demski (1988) rely on the
informativeness principle to show that a performance measure may be
useful even though it is not controllable by the agent, as long as it provides
incremental information on the agent’s performance (e.g., the use of com-
petitors’ results in relative performance evaluation). In a similar vein,
Bushman et al. (1995) demonstrate that aggregate, higher-level perform-
ance measures that are not completely controllable by the agent can be
informative of the agent’s actions when interdependencies across units
exist that are not captured in local, “own unit” measures.
Finally, a measure’s informativeness may vary with the breadth of plan
coverage. When a single incentive plan covers a broad and diverse set of
activities and locations, it becomes difficult for management to prespecify
a common set of specific actions that are desired for all participating
employees. As a result, aggregate financial measures that capture a broader
set of actions and allow comparisons across diverse units may be relatively
more informative than specific nonfinancial or behavioral measures (Beis-
chel and Smith 1991).
C. Reasons for Adopting Worker Incentive Plans
The compensation literature suggests that performance evaluation and
reward systems have multiple objectives, not all of which are directly
related to the motivational issues addressed in agency models (Merchant
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1989; Lawler and Jenkins 1990; Heneman et al. 1999; Prendergast 1999).
For example, incentive plans may be designed to attract and maintain key
personnel. Plans can be used to control compensation costs or to make
pay more variable with firm financial performance, thereby shifting fi-
nancial risk from the company to the employees. Reward systems can
help foster a desired organizational change by communicating new or-
ganizational goals. Some of these objectives may be in conflict with mo-
tivational objectives. For example, efforts to use the bonus plan to control
compensation costs may limit the incentive value of the reward system.
Alternatively, the need to attract adequate talent may lead organizations
to minimize the link between pay and performance when determining
bonus awards in order to increase compensation.
The differing objectives may also affect the choice of performance mea-
sures. Efforts to make pay more variable with company performance cause
many companies to base bonus awards on firm-level financial performance
to avoid paying bonuses when financial results are poor (Merchant 1989;
Heneman et al. 1999). Behavioral or nonfinancial measures, on the other
hand, may be more useful for promoting organizational change. Both
economics and organizational psychology studies suggest that financial
measures such as profits and costs provide weak direction to workers and
make it difficult to communicate how a particular worker’s actions affect
new performance goals (e.g., Wruck and Jensen 1994; Heneman et al.
1999). Thus, the choice of performance measures is expected to be a
function not only of the measures’ informativeness but also of the other
reasons for adopting the plan.
D. Stakeholder Interests
Economic models typically assume that compensation contracts are
designed by the owners of the firm to minimize agency problems. How-
ever, behavioral research indicates that the interests of other stakeholder
groups can also influence compensation plan design. Waggoner et al.’s
(1999) interdisciplinary review of the performance measurement literature
notes that organizations are “political arenas” in which divergent con-
stituencies attempt to institutionalize performance criteria that serve their
interests. The potential conflicts that arise as various constituencies try
to promote self-interested performance measures are resolved through the
use of power and bargaining.
Empirical studies support claims that stakeholder groups can influence
compensation plan design. Sociology-based research, for example, finds
that more powerful executives tend to have more favorable compensation
contracts than less powerful executives (e.g., Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989;
Wade, O’ Reilly, and Chandratat 1990). Similarly, empirical studies in-
dicate that unions can affect the design of incentive plans and the per-
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formance gains from their implementation (e.g., Schwarz 1989; Kim 1996).
The participation of these groups in incentive plan design is therefore
expected to influence the performance measures included in the plan,
independent of the measures’ ability to motivate workers (Waggoner et
al. 1999).
III. Sample and Measures
A. Sample
We conduct our analyses using survey data collected by theConsortium
for Alternative Reward Strategies Research (CARS), an association of
companies, consulting firms, and universities studying the effective use
of reward systems. Several criteria had to be met before an incentive plan
was included in the CARS sample: (i) the plan covered at least 20 em-
ployees; (ii) the plan was designed for nonmanagement employees (al-
though it could also cover managers and executives); (iii) the plan had a
clear, preannounced performance-payout link; and (iv) the plan did not
require all payouts to be deferred. Excluded were skill-based pay plans,
suggestion systems, plans in operation less than one year, or plans in the
public sector (except health care). The CARS researchers used a detailed
telephone-screening process to identify approximately 2,200 reward plans
meeting these criteria. Surveys were mailed to potential respondents in
1991, 1992, and 1993, yielding information on 737 individual plans.2 After
deleting responses with missing data, 607 observations are used in our
analyses.
The respondents span a variety of manufacturing and service sectors
(see table 1). The organizational units covered by the incentive plans vary,
with 26% covering workers throughout the entire company; 20% cov-
ering a group, subsidiary, division, or strategic business unit; 42%covering
a plant, office, operating unit, or similar facility; 9% covering a depart-
ment; and 3% covering a work group or small team. The mean plan covers
a unit with 2,942 employees (median p 442 employees) that is part of a
larger organization (mean p 15,730 employees; median p 3,237 em-
ployees). Descriptive statistics on plan and organizational characteristics
are provided in table 2.
B. Performance Measures Used in the Incentive Plans
The survey gathered information on the use of seven general categories
of performance measures for computing plan payouts: (i) accounting (e.g.,
profitability, earnings, revenues, return on assets), (ii) productivity (e.g.,
ratio of outputs to inputs), (iii) quality (e.g., internal defects and customer
2 The full screening process used to identify the initial sample is described in
McAdams and Hawk (1994).
This content downloaded from 130.91.118.71 on Thu, 26 May 2016 19:41:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Performance Measures in Incentive Plans S65
Table 1
Industrial Categories of the Survey Participants
Industry of Unit Number of Participants % of Sample
Automotive and Farm Equipment 22 3.6
Building Materials 7 1.2
Chemicals 32 5.3
Communications 13 2.1
Computer Services & Software 16 2.6
Consulting 5 .8
Electrical & Electronics 30 4.9
Finance & Banking 55 9.1
Food & Beverage 43 7.1
Forest & Paper Products 18 3.0
Hospitals & Healthcare 21 3.5
Insurance 34 5.6
General Manufacturing 169 27.8
Printing & Publishing 14 2.3
Retail Trade 7 1.2
General Services 24 4.0
Transportation 6 1.0
Utilities 37 6.1
Other 54 8.9
Total 607 100.0
assessments), (iv) safety (e.g., number of injuries and results of safety
audits), (v) attendance (e.g., perfect attendance or number of absences),
(vi) cost control (e.g., actual costs relative to standard costs), and (vii)
output or volume (e.g., unit goals for total output). Slightly more than
half (52%) of the units use accounting measures (denoted ACCT), 48%
use quality measures (denoted QUAL), 38% use cost measures (denoted
COST), 34% use volume measures (denoted VOL), 25% use productivity
measures (denoted PROD), 23% use safety measures (denoted SAFETY),
and 12% use attendance measures (denoted ATTEND).
We computed a variety of variables to capture the various performance
measure classifications discussed in Section II.A. The first variables assess
the plans’ use of nonfinancial measures. One limitation of the survey data
is the lack of information on the specific weights applied to financial and
nonfinancial measures when computing plan payouts. Consequently, we
used two variables to provide insight into the relative importance placed
on financial and nonfinancial measures. The first variable is coded one if
at least one of the performance measurement categories is nonfinancial,
and zero otherwise (denoted SOME_NF). We defined the accounting and
cost categories as “financial” measures, and the other categories as “non-
financial” measures. Sixty-nine percent of the plans use at least some
nonfinancial measures to compute payouts to participants. Second, we
developed a subsample of observations where we know the relative
weights because the plan uses all financial or all nonfinancial performance
measures (denoted ALL_NF). This variable is coded one if the unit uses
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Criterion variables:
SOME_NF .69 .46 .00 1.00
ALL_NF .45 .50 .00 1.00
ACCT .52 .50 .00 1.00
COST .38 .49 .00 1.00
VOL .34 .47 .00 1.00
QUAL .48 .50 .00 1.00
PROD .25 .44 .00 1.00
SAFETY .23 .42 .00 1.00
ATTEND .12 .32 .00 1.00
WORKER .22 .42 .00 1.00
BUS_UNIT .34 .48 .00 1.00
PROFIT .44 .50 .00 1.00
Predictor variables:
Informativeness:
INNOV .00 .69 2.17 3.39
INVOLVE .00 .60 .43 3.90
CONTIMP .29 .46 .00 1.00
TELECOMM .02 .14 .00 1.00
UTILITY .06 .24 .00 1.00
DEREG .06 .24 .00 1.00
MKTPERF 3.53 .92 1.00 5.00
LAYOFFS 5.57 9.24 .00 50.00
MFG .61 .49 .00 1.00
Breath of plan coverage:
GROUP .20 .40 .00 1.00
OPER_UNIT .42 .49 .00 1.00
DEPT .09 .16 .00 1.00
TEAM .03 .16 .00 1.00
PERTOT .40 .41 .00 1.00
LOCATIONS 1.15 1.56 .00 8.16
Reasons for adopting:
ORGCHG .00 .73 1.90 1.24
PAYPERF .00 .80 1.57 1.32
WKFORCE .00 .81 1.14 2.03
Stakeholder interests:
MGTDESIGN .66 .47 .00 1.00
MGTSPECIFY .41 .49 .00 1.00
UNION .26 .44 .00 1.00
Note.—See appendix for definition of the variables. Sample size is 607 for all variables, except for
ALL_NF, where the total sample size is 346. INNOV, INVOLVE, ORGCHG, PAYPERF, and
WKFORCE are averages of standardized item scores, and thus have a zero mean.
only nonfinancial measures, and zero if only financial measures are used.
Forty-five percent of the plans in this subsample of 346 observations use
only nonfinancial measures.
As an alternative method for categorizing the plans’ performance mea-
surement choices, we performed k-means cluster analysis on the individual
measures. The analysis reveals three types of plans that roughly corre-
spond to the classifications proposed by Heneman et al. (1999).3 The first
3 The assignment to the cluster is based on the standard distance between each
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cluster includes 134 plans that make greater (but not necessarily exclusive)
use of worker-related or behavioral measures such as safety, attendance,
and productivity. The variable WORKER is coded one if the plan belongs
to this cluster, and zero otherwise. The second cluster contains 265 plans
that rely almost exclusively on accounting measures. We define this cluster
as profit-based plans, with the variable PROFIT equal to one if the plan
belongs to this cluster, and zero otherwise. The third cluster is charac-
terized by greater (but not necessarily exclusive) use of cost, volume, and
quality measures. These three measures are consistent with the business
unit metrics outlined by Cross and Lynch (1988/1989) and Heneman et
al. (1999). The variable BUS_UNIT is coded one for the 208 plans in this
cluster, and zero otherwise.
In addition to these aggregate classifications, we examine the factors
influencing the use of the seven individual performance measure cate-
gories. Each variable is coded one if that measurement category is used
to compute payouts, and zero otherwise.
Finally, we examine whether the measurement occurs at the level of the
unit covered by the plan (e.g., the plant) or at some higher organizational
level (e.g., group or corporate). The survey provides information on the
level at which each performancemeasure category ismeasured.We exclude
plans that do not contain a specific measure and also plans that cover all
workers in the corporation since it is not possible to measure performance
above this organizational level. The resulting sample sizes range from 46
for attendance measures to 246 for quality measures. For each of the seven
measurement categories, the dependent variable is coded one if the mea-
sure is used in the plan and is (at least partially) evaluated above the level
of the organizational unit covered by the plan, and zero otherwise.4 Ac-
counting performance is evaluated at a higher level most frequently (48%
of plans using accounting metrics), followed by volume (30%), quality
(30%), and cost (24%). Between 9% and 14% of plans using the other
categories measure performance at higher organizational levels.
C. Predictor Variables
Consistent with the discussion in Section II, we investigate four sets
of potential predictor variables for performance measure choices: (1) fac-
tors affecting the measures’ informativeness, (2) the breadth of plan cov-
erage, (3) the reasons for adopting the plan, and (4) alternative stakeholder
interests.
observation and the centroid of the cluster. Cluster analysis results are not pre-
sented in the tables to simplify presentation.
4 For example, a plan that covers workers within a department but measures
quality (at least partially) using plant-level quality statistics receives a value of
one for the use of higher-level quality measures.
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1. Informativeness
The performance measurement literature suggests a number of factors
that are expected to influence the relative informativeness of alternative
performance measures. We measure these factors using the following
variables.
Strategy.—Perhaps the most frequently cited determinant of ameasure’s
informativeness is the strategy or growth opportunities of the organi-
zation.5 The performance measurement literature typically represents
strategy as a continuum between organizations following a “defender”
or “cost leader” strategy and those following a growth-oriented “pros-
pector” or “innovation” strategy. In firms following a cost leader strategy,
the primary goal is increasing efficiency relative to the prior period. Con-
sequently, short-term financial measures such as accounting returns and
cost control are expected to be relatively informative indicators of em-
ployee performance. In innovative firms or firms with large growth op-
portunities, desired objectives such as new product development and mar-
ket share increases may take some time to improve financial performance,
making nonfinancial measures relatively more informative about current
employee actions.
Consistent with prior studies, we use three proxy variables to measure
the extent to which the company follows an innovation-oriented strategy:
research and development expenditures as a percent of sales, the (reverse-
coded) ratio of the firm’s book value to market value (a proxy for the
organization’s growth opportunities, with lower book-to-market values
assumed to reflect greater growth opportunities), and advertising expen-
ditures as a percent of sales. Each ratio is computed over the 5 years prior
to the year the survey was completed.6 The three variables load on a single
factor that explains 47.3% of the variance in the data. However, the Cron-
bach alpha for the variables is relatively low (0.44), indicating that the
internal consistency among the three indicators is lower than desired. The
construct INNOV is computed using the average standardized scores for
the three innovation proxies.
A second aspect of strategy that we examine is the extent to which the
unit pursues an operational strategy of continuous improvement. Studies
suggest that continuous improvement strategies increase the relative in-
5 See, e.g., Govindarajan and Gupta (1985), Lambert and Larcker (1987), Simons
(1987), Clinch (1991), Smith and Watts (1992), Bushman et al. (1995), Ittner et
al. (1997), and Keating (1997).
6 For firms with no Compustat data (either private firms or firms without names
in the data file), median values for the unit’s industry are used. One limitation
to using Compustat data for computing the innovation construct is that the re-
sulting measure pertains to the company as a whole rather than the individual
unit covered by the plan. If the overall company strategy differs from the strategy
of the covered unit, our innovation construct will be inappropriate.
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formativeness of disaggregated, task-oriented nonfinancial measures be-
cause these measures are more closely related to the strategy’s objectives
(e.g., reduced defects or increased customer satisfaction) and providemore
information on the root causes of problems (e.g., Wruck and Jensen 1994;
Ittner and Larcker 1995, 1997; Ittner et al. 1997). In addition, since many
benefits from continuous improvement activities may not be fully re-
flected in short-term financial measures (Anderson, Fornell, and Lehman
1994), nonfinancial indicators of improvement efforts can provide incre-
mental information on current employee performance (Hauser et al. 1994;
Hemmer 1996).
We use two measures to capture this aspect of operational strategy. The
first variable addresses workers’ involvement in making suggestions and
changing work practices (denoted INVOLVE). This variable represents
the average standardized response to five questions on the percentage of
plan participants who are actively involved in individual suggestion pro-
grams, team/group suggestion programs, ad hoc problem-solving groups,
self-directed work teams, and employee management teams. Principal
component analysis of these five items produces one factor with an ei-
genvalue greater than one that retains 34.3% of the total variance. The
Cronbach alpha for this scale is 0.52.
The second measure captures the interaction between the plan’s design
and the unit’s operational strategy using an indicator variable for whether
the plan is viewed as an integral part of an established organizational
culture of continuous improvement (denoted CONTIMP). Twenty-nine
percent of the units report that their plans are used to support a continuous
improvement strategy.
Regulation.—Studies by Bushman et al. (1996) and Ittner et al. (1997)
find that financial measures may be less informative in regulated industries,
where regulators can implicitly or explicitly link profits or rate increases
to nonfinancial goals such as customer satisfaction, reliability, and em-
ployee safety. In these cases, it is in the company’s economic interest to
motivate employees to increase performance on these nonfinancial
dimensions.
We proxy for regulatory effects using indicator variables for units op-
erating in the utility (denoted UTILITY) and telecommunication (denoted
TELECOMM) industries. These indicators represent 6% and 2% of our
sample, respectively. In addition, we include an indicator variable for
changes in deregulation during the prior 2 years (denoted DEREG). Six
percent of our sample indicate that deregulation had a significant impact
on their markets during this period.
Type of operation.—Researchers suggest that the relative informative-
ness of different measures may differ in service and manufacturing op-
erations. Hayes (1977) argues that, in production departments, cause-and-
effect relations and standards can be relatively well established. As a result,
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output and cost objectives can be evaluated using accounting techniques
such as standard cost variance analysis and accounting returns. In service
departments, activities are more heterogeneous and less standard, requir-
ing a broader set of measures to evaluate performance. Mia and Chenhall
(1994) offer similar arguments, claiming that marketing organizations are
less routine and face more exceptions than production organizations,
thereby requiring a more diverse set of performance measures.
We measure this potential influence on informativeness using an in-
dicator variable (denoted MFG) that is coded one if the unit supported
by the plan covers a manufacturing operation, and zero otherwise.7 Sixty-
one percent of the plans cover manufacturing operations.
Past financial performance.—Ittner et al. (1997) argue that financial
measures may be more informative when the organization has experienced
poor performance. The intuition behind this claim is that short-term im-
provements in cash flow and other financial indicators of organizational
viability are required to avoid the costs of financial distress, making fi-
nancial measures more informative about desired employee actions.
Although we do not have data on actual financial performance, the
survey contains information related to the units’ performance during the
prior 2 years. We use the unit’s self-reported performance relative to its
market (rated on a five-point scale, with 1 being worse than the market
in which they compete and 5 being better than the market) as one in-
dication of past performance (denoted MKTPERF). The average unit
reports that its relative market performance is 3.53 on the five-point scale,
or slightly better than its competitors. We also use the percentage of
employees eligible to participate in the plan who were laid off or ter-
minated during the prior 2 years as an indicator of poor performance
(denoted LAYOFFS). On average, the units laid off or terminated 5.5%
of their workers.
2. Breadth of Plan Coverage
Related to the issue of informativeness is the breadth of activities cov-
ered by the incentive plan. We use three sets of variables to measure this
attribute. First, we include indicator variables to capture the highest level
in the organization covered by the plan. GROUP refers to all nonman-
agement workers within an entire group, subsidiary, division, or strategic
business unit; OPER_UNIT refers to workers in a plant, office, operating
unit, hospital, branch, or store; DEPT refers to workers in a department;
and TEAM refers to workers in a work group or small team.8 We assume
7 Service operations in manufacturing companies (e.g., marketing and purchas-
ing) are coded zero.
8 The omitted category is corporate-level plans covering all nonmanagement
workers in the company.
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that GROUP, OPER_UNIT, DEPT, and TEAM capture respectively nar-
rower sets of activities within the firm.
Second, we include the number of locations covered by the plan under
the assumption that a greater number of locations is associated with a
broader set of activities and greater coordination requirements. The av-
erage plan covers 29 locations (median p 2). Given the skewness in the
data, the variable LOCATIONS is computed using the natural logarithm
of the number of locations covered by the plan.
Finally, the variable PCT_TOTALmeasures the percentage of the com-
pany’s employees who are covered by the plan. Keating (1997) argues
that aggregated, higher-level performance measures are more likely to be
influenced by plan participants’ actions when these participants represent
a larger proportion of the firm. Thus, these measures should be more
informative performance indicators in plans covering a large percentage
of employees. The average plan covers 40% of the employees in the
organization.
3. Reasons for Adopting Incentive Plans
The survey asked 11 questions on possible reasons for introducing the
incentive plan (other than simply motivating employees to achieve some
performance objective). Principal component analysis (with oblique ro-
tation) of the 11 survey items reveals three factors with eigenvalues greater
than one and retaining 64% of the total variance. Four questions load
greater than 0.40 on the first factor. These questions address the impor-
tance of the plan in promoting “organizational change” by (1) enhancing
communication of unit objectives, (2) encouraging intrapreneurship, (3)
fostering teamwork, and (4) improving morale and/or employee relations.
The resulting organizational change variable (denotedORGCHG) is com-
puted using the average standardized response to these questions (Cron-
bach ).ap 0.72
The second factor relates to the implementation of a “pay-for-per-
formance” culture. The three questions loading greater than 0.40 on this
factor relate to the importance of (1) better pay-for-performance linkage,
(2) reducing entitlement mentality, and (3) making labor costs more var-
iable with organization performance. The variable PAYPERF is computed
using the average standardized responses to these three questions (Cron-
bach ).ap 0.74
The third factor relates to the objective of “improving and upgrading
the workforce.” Average standardized scores for the four questions load-
ing greater than 0.40 on this factor ([1] importance of the plan in enabling
the unit to become more competitive in total compensation, [2] assisting
in recruiting, [3] improving employee relations, and [4] upgrading the
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quality of the workforce) are used to compute the variable WKFORCE
(Cronbach ).ap 0.83
4. Stakeholder Interests
Finally, we examine the influence of two stakeholder groups on the
choice of performance measures. Management involvement in incentive
plan design is measured using two items from the survey. The first (de-
noted MGTDESIGN) is an indicator variable that identifies whether
headquarters mandated the design or the plan design task force only
included management employees. Sixty-six percent of the plans were de-
signed solely by management. The second (denoted MGTSPECIFY) is
an indicator variable identifying whether top management specified some
or all of the performance measures use in the plan. Top management
specified performance measures in 41% of the plans.
We examine the influence of unions on plan design using a variable
(denoted UNION) that is coded one if the plan covers at least some union
employees, and zero otherwise. Twenty-six percent of the plans cover
union workers.
D. Correlations among Predictor Variables
Correlations among the predictor variables are reported in table 3. The
magnitudes are generally small, creating no serious problems with mul-
ticollinearity in subsequent tests. Despite the small magnitudes, a number
of interesting relations emerge. Plans in manufacturing operations tend
to cover workers throughout the operation, rather than just those in
departments or teams; tend to cover fewer locations; and are less likely
to be implemented as a means to upgrade the workforce. Group-level
plans cover more locations, reflecting the wide breadth of activities en-
compassed by these plans. Plans covering union workers tend to have
less top management involvement in specifying the plan’s performance
measures, are less likely to use the incentive plan to upgrade theworkforce,
and are more likely to have operating unit-level coverage of workers.
Plans designed to drive organizational change are positively associated
with workforce involvement in decision-making and pay-for-performance
objectives, but they are negatively associated with the number of units
covered by the plan.
IV. Results
A. Use of Aggregate Performance Measure Classifications
Table 4 presents logit results for the five aggregate performance mea-
surement classifications (ALL_NF, SOME_NF, WORKER, BUS_UNIT,
and PROFIT). The models’ pseudo R2’s range from 0.259 to 0.431 (p !
). Consistent with previous CEO and business unit studies, several0.001
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Table 3
Pearson Correlations among the Predictor Variables (n p 607)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1. INNOV 1.000
2. INVOLVE .034 1.000
3. CONTIMP .025 .004 1.000
4. TELECOMM .054 .051 .005 1.000
5. UTILITY .134 .027 .013 .038 1.000
6. DEREG .111 .059 .073 .010 .338 1.000
7. MKTPERF .021 .071 .234 .035 .027 .071 1.000
8. LAYOFFS .058 .054 .076 .038 .092 .014 .079 1.000
9. MFG .083 .185 .124 .140 .265 .152 .000 .010 1.000
10. GROUP .004 .067 .074 .070 .039 .022 .007 .051 .112 1.000
11. PLANT .026 .224 .003 .055 .144 .046 .036 .003 .370 .415 1.000
12. DEPT .059 .067 .058 .030 .012 .058 .000 .032 .232 .159 .270 1.000
13. TEAM .070 .050 .033 .024 .004 .048 .022 .034 .136 .079 .134 .051 1.000
14. PERTOT .023 .066 .114 .024 .170 .153 .001 .007 .148 .071 .282 .183 .084 1.000
15. LOCATIONS .009 .176 .050 .148 .123 .180 .003 .006 .301 .198 .304 .057 .015 .167 1.000
16. ORGCHG .062 .206 .117 .129 .013 .029 .035 .115 .168 .039 .180 .099 .017 .059 .201 1.000
17. PAYPERF .166 .021 .066 .016 .008 .016 .118 .036 .013 .011 .036 .042 .051 .045 .045 .293 1.000
18. WKFORCE .011 .015 .128 .098 .087 .052 .063 .043 .210 .011 .165 .120 .078 .163 .022 .222 .260 1.000
19. MGTDESIGN .016 .131 .219 .058 .021 .021 .165 .061 .096 .021 .154 .008 .002 .092 .093 .217 .204 .126 1.000
20. MGTSPEC .067 .056 .001 .053 .028 .014 .089 .005 -.001 .057 .100 .102 .045 .002 .025 .109 .090 .083 .145 1.000
21. UNION .150 .013 .179 .010 .241 .084 .065 .068 .215 .085 .219 .049 .094 .090 .084 .121 .087 .293 .209 .084
Note.—See appendix for variable definitions. Absolute value of correlations 1 .104 two-tail); two-tail); two-tail); and(p ! .01, 1 .080 (p ! .05, 1 .067 (p ! .10,
two-tail).1 .058 (p ! .15,
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Table 4
Logit Models Examining the Determinants of Performance Measure
Configurations in Worker Incentive Plans
ALL_NF SOME_NF WORKER BUS_UNIT PROFIT
Intercept .167 1.198* .648 2.027*** .272
(.874) (.613) (.727) (.598) (.583)
Informativeness:
INNOV .126 .124 .299* .339** .097
(.215) (.154) (.169) (.157) (.149)
INVOLVE .176 .079 .095 .112 .165
(.225) (.185) (.180) (.164) (.174)
CONTIMP .428 .767*** .542** 1.167*** .865***
(.364) (.252) (.276) (.215) (.234)
TELECOMM .431 .689 .794 .376 .657
(.986) (.365) (1.124) (.718) (.669)
UTILITY .485 2.033*** .082 1.150*** 1.111**
(.917) (.656) (.579) (.451) (.495)
DEREG .762 .666 .299 .532 .343
(.599) (.457) (.530) (.453) (.427)
MKTPERF .174 .063 .159 .225** .148
(.177) (.119) (.128) (.109) (.112)
LAYOFFS .010 .001 .010 .003 .006
(.014) (.011) (.012) (.011) (.011)
MFG 1.135*** .942*** .097 .203 .273
(.350) (.248) (.299) (.246) (.237)
Breadth of plan
coverage:
PCT TOTAL 1.539*** 1.171*** 1.010*** .522* 1.303***
(.390) (.286) (.353) (.291) (.278)
LOCATIONS .293*** .195*** .211** .097 .026
(.104) (.067) (.100) (.069) (.067)
GROUP .235 .417 .291 .481 .175
(.473) (.297) (.473) (.310) (.298)
OPER_UNIT 1.888*** 1.143*** .947** .381 1.021***
(.418) (.290) (.388) (.308) (.285)
DEPT 1.780*** .999*** 1.159** .202 .927***
(.561) (.447) (.492) (.418) (.410)
TEAM 1.749* 1.539* .926 .547 1.045
(1.074) (.872) (.727) (.668) (.605)
Reasons for adopting:
ORGCHG .356* .469*** .402** .325** .668***
(.203) (.161) (.179) (.159) (.156)
PAYPERF .357* .038 .518*** .409*** .064
(.198) (.790) (.163) (.139) (.139)
WKFORCE .012 .271* .254 .613 .483***
(.195) (.148) (.162) (.149) (.145)
Stakeholder interests:
MGTDESIGN .091 .184 .274 .043 .277
(.317) (.240) (.254) (.221) (.223)
MGTSPECIFY .511* .131 .146 .291 .100
(.293) (.214) (.236) (.202) (.203)
UNION .385 .228 .638** .267 .329
(.375) (.280) (.280) (.298) (.262)
Pseudo R2 .431 .311 .264 .259 .342
N 346 607 607 607 607
Note.—See appendix for variable definitions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
 (two-tail).p ! .15
* (two-tail).p ! .10
** (two-tail).p ! .05
*** (two-tail).p ! .01
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of the informativeness variables are significant predictors of performance
measurement choices. Manufacturing operations are negatively associated
with the use of nonfinancial measures, supporting claims that nonfinancial
measures are relatively more informative in service operations (Hayes
1977; Mia and Chenhall 1994). Plans used to support a continuous im-
provement strategy (CONTIMP) tend to use a mixture of financial and
nonfinancial measures, as seen in the significant, positive relations in the
SOME_NF and BUS_UNIT models and the negative relations in the
WORKER and PROFIT models. Surprisingly, employee involvement in
developing work processes (INVOLVE) is not associated with the overall
choice of performance measures, at least using the aggregate classifications.
This finding contradicts extensive discussions on the influence of worker
decision rights on compensation plan design (e.g., Wruck and Jensen 1994;
Ittner and Larcker 1995). In contrast to prior studies, our innovation
strategy measure is not significant in the two nonfinancial models. How-
ever, more innovative units make greater use of worker-related measures
and less use of business unit measures, suggesting that these classifications
provide better aggregate representations of worker measurement choices
in innovation-oriented firms than does the distinction between financial
and nonfinancial measures.
The proxies for past performance (MKTPERF and LAYOFFS) are not
significant at conventional levels, implying that aggregate measurement
choices are not affected by the unit’s performance. Deregulation andmem-
bership in the telecommunications industry also exhibit little statistical
significance. Utilities, on the other hand, tend to choose a mixture of
financial and nonfinancial measures, with the coefficient on UTILITY
significantly positive in the SOME_NF and BUS_UNIT models and sig-
nificantly negative in the PROFIT model.
The other sets of predictor variables also explain measurement choices.
The strongest results involve variables capturing the breadth of plan im-
plementation. Plans covering a larger percentage of employees use finan-
cial, business unit, and profit measures more frequently and worker-level
measures less frequently. Those covering more locations also tend to place
greater emphasis on financial measures and less emphasis on worker mea-
sures. Plans covering workers throughout a group exhibit few differences
from those covering the entire corporation (i.e., the omitted category).
However, plans covering smaller groups of employees (OPER_UNIT,
DEPT, and TEAM) generally make greater use of nonfinancial andworker
measures and less use of profit measures than group or corporate plans.
Taken together, the plan breadth results are consistent with nonfinancial
or worker-related measures being more informative about worker actions
in less diverse settings, where it is easier to prespecify the desired actions
of all plan participants.
The reasons for adopting the plan also appear to play a significant role
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in measurement choices. In particular, using the plan as an instrument for
changing organizational communication, teamwork, and morale
(ORGCHG) has a strong positive relation with the use of nonfinancial
performance measures, worker measures, and business unit measures, and
a negative relation with profit-oriented plans. It is interesting that im-
proving and upgrading the workforce (WKFORCE) has a negative re-
lation with the adoption of plans containing at least some nonfinancial
performance measures and a positive relation with profit-oriented plans.
However, this objective is not statistically related to the adoption of
worker-oriented measures (WORKER). Adopting the plan to improve
pay-for-performance linkages (PAYPERF) has a negative association with
the use of pure nonfinancial plans and worker-related measures and a
positive association with business unit measures. These tests provide no
support for Heneman et al.’s (1999) claim that accounting measures are
preferred when management attempts to link the payment of workers’
bonuses to the company’s ability to pay.
Finally, the significant coefficients on MGTSPECIFY suggest that top
management tends to move the plan away from sole reliance on financial
measures, instead emphasizing a combination of financial and nonfinancial
business-unit measures. Plans designed by management personnel, on the
other hand, have no significant association with these measurement
choices. In contrast to management-specified plans, plans implemented
in union settings are more likely to include worker-related measures,
potentially reflecting the union’s desire to have member compensation
based on measures that are more controllable and have greater “line of
sight” for union workers.9
In sum, results using the aggregate measurement classifications support
economic theories that the choice of performance measures is influenced
by the measures’ informativeness. However, the evidence suggests that
other factors such as nonmotivational reasons for adopting the plan and
alternative stakeholder interests also have a significant impact on mea-
surement choices. As a result, compensation studies that ignore these
factors provide an incomplete picture of performancemeasurement system
design and implementation.
9 To provide some evidence on the relative explanatory power of the various
sets of predictors, we estimated backward stepwise models. In this procedure, the
full model is estimated first. Each set of explanatory variables is then removed
one at a time, with the other variables remaining in the model. The change in
explanatory power (pseudo R2) relative to the full model, as well as the statistical
significance of the change, can then be estimated. Themedian percentage reduction
in the full model’s pseudo R2 is 37.7% when the plan breadth variables were
dropped, 14.3% when the informativeness variables were dropped, 11.7% when
the reason for adoption variables were dropped, and 2.3% when the stakeholder
variables were dropped.
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B. Use of Individual Performance Measure Categories
Table 5 presents results when indicators for the individual performance
measure categories serve as criterion variables. These tests provide ex-
ploratory insight into the extent to which the factors influencing the use
of different measures within the five aggregate classifications vary. The
organization of table 5 follows the earlier cluster analysis results, with
the measures within the PROFIT, BUS_UNIT, and WORKER clusters
arranged in adjacent columns. Although many of the results are consistent
with those in table 4, some of the predictor variables that were insignificant
using the aggregate performance measure classifications are significant
determinants of individual performance measures. Furthermore, many of
the significant explanatory variables differ within the aggregate categories.
Some of the most striking results are the insignificant relations between
the informativeness variables and the use of accounting measures. Instead,
the influence of informativeness issues on the adoption of accounting-
based measures tends to be driven by the breadth of plan coverage. Ac-
counting measures are used more frequently when the plan covers a larger
percentage of employees and more locations. Corporate and group plans
also use accounting measures more often than operating unit or depart-
mental plans. Other factors affecting the use of accounting measures in-
clude the plans’ emphasis on pay-for-performance objectives and stake-
holder issues. In particular, management involvement in plan design
(MGTDESIGN and MGTDESIGN) is positively associated with the use
of accounting measures. These results suggest that managers may impose
their own incentives (which frequently are accounting-based) on workers.
In contrast, plans in unionized units make less use of accountingmeasures,
which union workers often have little control over.
Informativeness issues have a greater effect on the use of the individual
business unit and worker measures. As seen previously, plans that support
a continuous improvement strategy use both financial (cost) and nonfi-
nancial (volume, quality, and attendance) measuresmore frequently.How-
ever, these plans use safety measures less frequently. In contrast to results
using the aggregate measurement classifications, employee involvement in
developing work practices also appears to influence measurement choices,
with greater involvement associated with the use of volume, productivity,
and safety measures. This evidence provides some support for claims that
the allocation of decision rights to workers increases the informativeness
of nonfinancial measures (e.g., Wruck and Jensen 1994). Innovation-ori-
ented strategies, on the other hand, are negatively related to the use of
volume, safety, and attendance measures.
Utilities are associated with the use of nonfinancial quality, safety, and
attendance measures together with cost measures. These results are con-
sistent with the evidence in table 4, which indicated that utilities tend to
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Table 5
Logit Models Examining Determinants of the Specific Performance Measures Used in 607 Worker Incentive Plans
ACCT COST VOL QUAL PROD SAFETY ATTEND
Intercept .543 1.589*** .376 .609 .652 2.367*** .837
(.615) (.574) (.521) (.576) (.648) (.809) (.773)
Informativeness:
INNOV .071 .206 .566*** .118 .032 .421** .318
(.153) (.146) (.169) (.405) (.160) (.175) (.209)
INVOLVE .113 .056 .340** .198 .360** .473*** .258
(.175) (.158) (.160) (.164) (.163) (.177) (.206)
CONTIMP .218 .891*** .612*** .925*** .094 .474* .524
(.234) (.210) (.215) (.221) (.241) (.283) (.306)
TELECOMM .133 .801 .855 .430 .961 .442 .017
(.698) (.739) (.743) (.694) (1.107) (1.144) (1.100)
UTILITY .608 1.159*** .118 1.013** .107 3.912*** 1.893***
(.512) (.445) (.458) (.475) (.506) (.593) (.521)
Reasons for adopting:
DEREG .503 .386 .690 .170 .000 .993* .416
(.474) (.429) (.473) (.421) (.485) (.581) (.555)
MKTPERF .115 .130 .226** .077 .165 .336** .387***
(.115) (.106) (.110) (.108) (.117) (.137) (.149)
LAYOFFS .003 .007 .019* .003 .006 .003 .003
(.011) (.010) (.011) (.010) (.011) (.013) (.016)
MFG .169 .089 .895*** .776*** .072 .897*** .149
(.499) (.237) (.244) (.239) (.272) (.341) (.329)
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Breadth of plan coverage:
PCT TOTAL 1.013*** .151 .990*** .931*** .848*** .575 .584
(.292) (.026) (.296) (.277) (.319) (.370) (.386)
LOCATIONS .219*** .078 .003 .015 .045 .040 .105
(.071) (.067) (.069) (.066) (.080) (.091) (.103)
GROUP .092 .531* .041 .600** .011 .996** .522
(.332) (.300) (.311) (.302) (.380) (.418) (.453)
OPER_UNIT 1.637*** .467 .029 .846*** .534 1.313*** .167
(.299) (.291) (.307) (.292) (.342) (.415) (.377)
DEPT 1.343*** .313 .435 1.049*** 1.055** .171 .545
(.409) (.412) (.395) (.409) (.439) (.664) (.602)
TEAM .824 .357 .305 .710 .709 .299 .146
(.623) (.672) (.644) (.628) (.673) (1.335) (.897)
Reasons for adopting:
ORGCHG .193 .346** .083 .774*** .465*** 1.007*** .336
(.159) (.152) (.156) (.155) (.170) (.209) (.210)
PAYPERF .345** .256* .338** .243* .215 .396** .119
(.145) (.133) (.139) (.135) (.149) (.167) (.189)
WKFORCE .084 .554*** .119 .645*** .181 .304* .430**
(.146) (.142) (.141) (.144) (.150) (.185) (.190)
Stakeholder interests:
MGTDESIGN .574** .357* .517** .148 .310 .592** .228
(.232) (.210) (.218) (.217) (.229) (.272) (.302)
MGTSPEC .407* .262 .046 .012 .249 .201 .048
(.211) (.195) (.201) (.197) (.214) (.249) (.278)
UNION .692** .148 .042 .255 .628** .463* .309
(.271) (.239) (.872) (.247) (.257) (.281) (.365)
Pseudo R2 .401 .235 .234 .301 .185 .399 .135
Note.—See appendix for variable definitions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
 (two-tail).p ! .15
* (two-tail).p ! .10
** (two-tail).p ! .05
*** (two-tail).p ! .01
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use some nonfinancial measures in their plans, but are no more likely
than other companies to focus exclusively on nonfinancial performance.
Recently deregulated units place less emphasis on volume and safety (two
measures commonly used by regulators to set prices or profit levels), but
a unit’s presence in the telecommunications industry has no significant
effect on the choice of individual measures.
The results for manufacturing units are mixed and indicate less use of
quality and volume measures but more use of safety measures. The quality
result is somewhat surprising given extensive discussions on the role of
nonfinancial quality measures in evaluating manufacturing performance
(e.g., Kaplan 1983; Ittner and Larcker 1995). Although the coefficients
on MFG are positive in the ACCT and COST models, we find no sig-
nificant evidence that manufacturing units use these financial measures
more often than service operations.
Finally, units that experienced poor performance in the past tend to
use safety and attendance measures less frequently and volume measures
more frequently. Layoffs are negatively related to the use of volume mea-
sures, but the variable is not significant in the other models. Contrary to
our predictions, past performance has no significant association with the
use of accounting and cost control measures.
Results for the plan breadth variables suggest that the influence of these
variables on the use of business unit and worker-oriented measures is
often opposite their influence on the use of accounting measures. Plans
covering a greater percentage of employees, which make greater use of
accounting measures, make less use of all of the nonfinancial measurement
categories. Conversely, group, operating unit, and departmental plans,
which tend to make less use of accounting measures than corporate plans,
make greater use of many of the business unit and worker measures.
Team-based plans and the number of locations have no significant as-
sociation with the business unit and worker measures.
The choice of individual performance measures is also affected by the
reasons for introducing the plan. Plans designed to foster organizational
change have a significant influence on the use of most of the nonfinancial
worker and business unit measures. Quality, productivity, and safetymea-
sures are all used more frequently in these plans, in conjunction with cost
control measures. However, use of attendance measures is less frequent
when organizational change is a major objective. Along with greater use
of accounting measures, plans implemented to improve pay-for-perform-
ance linkages use all three categories of business unit measures to a greater
extent, but they exhibit lower use of the worker-oriented safety and at-
tendance measures. Thus, even in plans designed to increase pay-for-
performance relations, it appears that companies view some types of non-
financial measures to be useful in promoting this objective. Plans put into
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place to upgrade the workforce include attendance measures more fre-
quently, but use quality, cost, and (surprisingly) safety measures less often.
Whereas management participation in plan design is positively asso-
ciated with the use of accounting measures, it is negatively associatedwith
cost and volume measures. Top management’s imposition of some or all
of the measures in the plan has little effect on the use of business unit or
worker measures. Unionized units, on the other hand, accompany lower
use of accounting measures with greater use of two of the worker-oriented
measures (productivity and safety), again highlighting the significant role
stakeholder interests play in incentive plan design.
Overall, the evidence in table 5 indicates that the use of specific per-
formance measures is a function of the measures’ informativeness, the
breadth of plan coverage, the reasons for adopting the plan, and stake-
holder interests. However, the use of specific measures within the aggre-
gate measurement categories is not necessarily influenced by the same
factors, suggesting that the use of these aggregate classifications in research
understates the complexity of measurement system design.
C. Level of Performance Measurement
Compensation researchers argue that the effective choice of perform-
ance measures depends not only on the type of measures but also on the
level of measurement (e.g., Bushman et al. 1995; Keating 1997). We there-
fore extend the analysis to examine whether the individual performance
measures are computed at the level of the unit covered by the plan (e.g.,
the plant) or at some higher organizational level (e.g., group or corporate).
The results are provided in table 6. Due in part to the small number of
plans containing attendance measures and the near absence of higher-level
measurement of this metric (only 4 of 46 in this subsample), the attendance
model is not significant at the 10% level and is not reported in the table.
The remaining models explain a significant proportion of the variance in
the criterion variables, with pseudo R2s ranging from 0.385 to 0.625.
The most consistent determinants of measurement level are the breadth
of plan coverage variables. Plans covering a larger percentage of the or-
ganization’s employees and more locations tend to use higher-level ac-
counting, volume, quality, and productivity measures. The use of higher-
level measures also increases when the plan is designed for lower-level
organizational units. Relative to plans covering teams (the omitted cate-
gory), group and operating unit plans make less use of higher-level ac-
counting and business unit measures but use similar measurement levels
for the two behavioral metrics (productivity and safety). Department-
level plans use higher-level quality and productivity measures marginally
less often than team plans, but the measurement level for the other four
categories is not significantly different across these two levels.
This content downloaded from 130.91.118.71 on Thu, 26 May 2016 19:41:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Table 6
Logit Models Examining the Use of Performance Measures Computed
above the Level of the Participants in Worker Incentive Plans
ACCT COST VOL QUAL PROD SAFETY
Intercept .948 1.783 1.583 1.046 .975 3.759
(1.509) (1.834) (1.848) (1.248) (2.213) (164.297)
Informativeness:
INNOV .121 .251 .406 .294 .230 .304
(.311) (.445) (.413) (.295) (.670) (.508)
INVOLVE .007 1.169** .120 .049 1.197*** .014
(.339) (.504) (.341) (.263) (.427) (.490)
CONTIMP .105 1.051* .866 .921** .719 .491
(.456) (.637) (.703) (.396) (.984) (1.013)
TELECOMM .275 10.637 1.996 .546 6.543 8.400
(1.307) (56.665) (1.713) (1.287) (99.640) (164.279)
UTILITY 1.107 9.103 7.612 1.511 9.429 10.400
(.946) (33.325) (32.449) (.988) (45.053) (52.001)
DEREG 1.018 6.856 8.416 .352 9.552 19.173
(.859) (40.873) (38.643) (.982) (51.074) (99.981)
MKTPERF .205 .875*** .371 .464** .600 .322
(.228) (.337) (.354) (.216) (.546) (.424)
LAYOFFS .020 .060 .001 .002 .086*** .140
(.020) (.039) (.032) (.017) (.033) (.103)
MFG .583 1.268* 1.011 .945* 2.073* 2.964***
(.454) (.759) (.886) (.499) (1.187) (1.088)
Breadth of plan
coverage:
PCT TOTAL 2.863*** 1.415 2.455** 1.539** 1.695 1.354
(.514) (1.064) (.996) (.574) (1.164) (1.107)
LOCATIONS .287** .063 .379 .174 .459* .229
(.132) (.147) (.240) (.066) (.237) (.303)
GROUP 3.987*** 1.829 4.931*** 3.105*** 3.651 2.650
(1.212) (1.432) (1.531) (.995) (1.999) (164.293)
OPER_UNIT 2.079* 2.168a* 2.356* 1.716* 3.054 3.326
(1.190) (1.437) (1.308) (.929) (2.111) (164.290)
DEPT .378 2.049 .182 1.589 2.975 6.115
(1.285) (1.654) (1.240) (.992) (1.922) (173.149)
Reasons for adopting:
ORGCHG .364 .645 2.218*** .359 .745 .753
(.359) (.581) (.693) (.330) (.720) (.807)
PAYPERF .004 .277 .016 .036 .625 .502
(.279) (.435) (.457) (.293) (.715) (.648)
WKFORCE .118 .575 1.019** .673** .438 .237
(.287) (.457) (.446) (.282) (.587) (.702)
Stakeholder interests:
MGTDESIGN .638 .107 .111 .515 .632 .547
(.488) (.648) (.699) (.423) (.840) (.938)
MGTSPEC .409 1.152 2.271*** .104 1.359 .223
(.406) (.661) (.701) (.379) (.979) (.886)
UNION 1.580** .721 .288 .670 .223 .769
(.628) (.712) (.830) (.431) (.906) (.910)
Pseudo R2 .478 .609 .625 .385 .536 .485
N 181 184 164 246 134 118
Note.—See appendix for variable definitions. The dependent variable is coded one if the measure is
used in the plan and is (at least partially) evaluated above the level of the organizational unit covered by
the plan, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses.
 (two-tail). * (two-tail). ** (two-tail). *** (two-tail).p ! .15 p ! .10 p ! .05 p ! .01
This content downloaded from 130.91.118.71 on Thu, 26 May 2016 19:41:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Performance Measures in Incentive Plans S83
The plan breadth results (at least partially) reflect the organizational
interdependencies captured by these variables. While groups or business
units may operate in a relatively independent fashion, departments and
teams must often coordinate their efforts or integrate their output to
achieve desired results (Scott and Tiessen 1999), leading to greater use of
higher-level measures (which capture these interdependencies) in depart-
mental and team plans. The greater use of higher-level measures in plans
covering more locations and a larger percentage of the organization’s
employees also supports claims that these measures are more informative
when the plan covers a larger number of interdependent activities (Beischel
and Smith 1991; Bushman et al. 1995; Keating 1997).
Research on quality measurement practices indicates that effective im-
plementation of a continuous improvement strategy requires at least some
of the performance measures to be more global in nature, rather than
strictly local measures of individual improvement project or team per-
formance, in order to coordinate improvement efforts and promote cross-
functional cooperation (Atkinson, Hamburg, and Ittner 1994). Consistent
with this claim, plans designed to support continuous improvement strat-
egies tend to use higher-level cost and quality measures. Employee in-
volvement is also associated with greater use of higher-level productivity
measures, but it is negatively related to higher-level measurement of costs.
Innovation strategies have little influence on the level of measurement.
The other informativeness variables exhibit mixed results. None of the
regulation variables is significant at conventional levels. Higher perform-
ance than competitors is associated with greater use of higher-level cost
and quality measures, and layoffs (an indicator of poor performance) are
associated with less use of higher-level cost measures. However, layoffs
are positively related to higher-level productivity measurement. Manu-
facturing units tend to use higher-level cost, quality, productivity, and
safety measures less often than service units, suggesting thatmanufacturing
operations may be more self-contained than service operations.
The reasons for plan adoption have little explanatory power. The only
significant relations are a positive association between organizational
change objectives and the use of higher-level volume measures and neg-
ative associations between pay-for-performance linkages and higher-level
volume and quality measurement.
Finally, we examine the influence of management participation and
unions on this measurement choice. Since upper-level managers are held
responsible for total organizational performance, they may attempt to
impose similar objectives on workers. If so, we would expect greater use
of higher-level measures in plans where management participated in the
design or mandated some or all of the performance measures. On the
other hand, union preferences for measures that are more controllable by
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their members would suggest an inverse relation between UNION and
the use of higher-level performance measures.
Contrary to these predictions, management’s role in specifying some
or all of the plan’s measures is negatively related to the use of higher-
level volume measures, while management involvement in plan design is
not statistically significant in any of the models. As expected, plans cov-
ering union employees incorporate higher-level accountingmeasures (over
which workers generally have little control) less frequently than other
plans. However, coefficients on this variable in the other models are not
significant at the 10% level (two-tail).
In general, the results in table 6 suggest that many of the same factors
influencing the types of performance measures in worker incentive plans,
especially informativeness issues and breadth of plan coverage, also in-
fluence the level of measurement. However, other factors, such as man-
agement involvement in plan design and alternative reasons for adopting
the plan, have a much greater influence on the types of measures included
in the plan than on the level of measurement.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Using a large sample of incentive plans designed for nonmanagement
employees, we examined some of the factors influencing the choice of
performance measures. We found that variables reflecting the breadth of
plan coverage and relative informativeness of the alternative measures are
the primary determinants of the measures used in worker incentive plans.
However, we also found that the reasons for adopting the plan (i.e., pro-
moting organizational change, improving pay-for-performance linkages,
and upgrading the workforce) play a role in performance measure choices,
as do unionization and management participation in plan design. Finally,
our results indicate that the factors influencing the use of specificmeasures
vary, suggesting that the aggregate performance measure classifications
commonly used in compensation research, such as the comparison of
financial versus nonfinancial metrics, provide somewhat misleading in-
ferences regarding performance measure choices.
As in all exploratory studies, our results are subject to several limita-
tions. First, some of our variables may have significant measurement error.
This is particularly true of our innovation construct, which is based on
company-level indicators rather than unit-level indicators and has a rel-
atively low reliability. Second, although we have information on the use
or nonuse of different performance measures, we do not have the weights
placed on these measures when computing plan payouts. Finally, many
of our predictor variables are endogenous choices, which will tend to
produce inconsistent parameter estimates. Future studies can attempt to
overcome this limitation using simultaneous equations models where the
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hypothesized determinants of measurement choices are also endogenous.
More important, future studies can build on this research to examine the
extent to which performance measurement choices and their determinants
affect the performance consequences of worker incentive plans.
Appendix
Variable Definitions
SOME_NF p one if at least one nonfinancial performance measure
is used in the plan, and zero otherwise. Accounting and
cost are financial categories and productivity, quality,
safety, attendance, and volume are nonfinancial categories.
ALL_NF p one if only nonfinancial performance measures are
used in the plan, and zero if only financial measures are
used in the plan (plans with a mixture of financial and
nonfinancial performance measures are coded as miss-
ing). Accounting and cost are financial categories and
productivity, quality, safety, attendance, and volume are
nonfinancial categories.
ACCT p one if accounting measures (e.g., profitability, reve-
nues, earnings, return on assets, etc.) are used for com-
puting plan payouts, and zero otherwise.
COST p one if cost control measures (e.g., cost relative to plan
goal) are used for computing plan payouts, and zero
otherwise.
VOL p one if volume measures (e.g., output relative to plan
goal) are used for computing plan payouts, and zero
otherwise.
QUAL p one if quality measures (e.g., internal defect rates and
external customer measures) are used for computing plan
payouts, and zero otherwise.
PROD p one if productivity measures (e.g., output per em-
ployee) are used for computing plan payouts, and zero
otherwise.
SAFETY p one if safety measures (e.g., number of injuries and
safety audit ratings) are used for computing plan pay-
outs, and zero otherwise.
ATTEND p one if attendance measures (e.g., perfect attendance)
are used for computing plan payouts, and zero
otherwise.
WORKER p one if the observation is assigned to the cluster of
performance measures that are primarily productivity,
safety, and attendance, and zero otherwise.
BUS_UNIT p one if the observation is assigned to the cluster of
performance measures that are primarily cost, volume,
and quality, and zero otherwise.
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PROFIT p one if the observation is assigned to the cluster of
performance measures that are primarily accounting, and
zero otherwise.
INNOV p average of the standardized scores for the book-to-
market ratio (reverse coded), research and development
expense to sales ratio, and advertising expense to sales
ratio. Each ratio is computed over the 5-year period prior
to survey collection. For firms with no Compustat data
(either private or unknown name), similar ratios are com-
puted using the median values for the industry of the
unit.
INVOLVE p average of the standardized scores for the percentage
of plan participants that are involved in individual sug-
gestion plans, team/group suggestion plans, ad hoc prob-
lem solving groups, self-directed work teams, and em-
ployee management teams.
CONTIMP p one if the plan is viewed as an integral part of an
established organizational culture of continuous im-
provement, and zero otherwise.
TELECOMM p one if the unit is in the telecommunications industry,
and zero otherwise.
UTILITY p one if the unit is in the utility industry, and zero
otherwise.
DEREG p one if the unit experienced deregulation during the
past 2 years, and zero otherwise.
MKTPERF p one (five) if unit performance is worse (better) than
the market in which they compete.
LAYOFFS p percentage of employees eligible to participate in the
plan who were laid off or terminated during the past 2
years.
MFG p one if the unit is best characterized as manufacturing
operation, and zero if best characterized as a service
operation.
LOCATIONS p natural logarithm of the number of locations covered
by the plan.
GROUP p one if the unit covered by the plan is an entire group,
subsidiary, division, or strategic business unit, and zero
otherwise.
PLANT p one if the unit covered by the plan is a plant, office,
operating unit, hospital, branch, or store, and zero
otherwise.
DEPT p one if the unit covered by the plan is a department,
and zero otherwise.
TEAM p one if the unit covered by the plan is a work group
or small team, and zero otherwise.
PERTOT p proportion of workers participating in the unit plan
relative to the total number of employees in the entire
organization.
This content downloaded from 130.91.118.71 on Thu, 26 May 2016 19:41:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Performance Measures in Incentive Plans S87
ORGCHG p average of the standardized scores to the following
items regarding the reasons for introducing the plan (1
p no importance; 5p high importance): enhance com-
munication of unit objectives; encourage intrapreneur-
ship; foster teamwork; improve morale and/or employee
relations.
PAYPERF p average of the standardized scores to the following
items regarding the reasons for introducing the plan (1p
no importance; 5 p high importance): better pay-per-
formance linkage; reduce entitlement mentality; make la-
bor costs more variable with organizational performance.
WKFORCE p average of the standardized scores to the following
items regarding the reasons for introducing the plan (1
p no importance; 5 p high importance): become more
competitive in total compensation; assist in recruiting;
improve employee retention; upgrade quality of
workforce.
MGTDESIGN p one if the plan design task force only included man-
agement employees or the design was mandated by head-
quarters, and zero otherwise.
MGTSPECIFY p one if management specified either some or all of the
performance measures used in the plan design, and zero
otherwise.
UNION p one if the unit has any union employees that partic-
ipate in the plan, and zero otherwise.
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